A Summary of Proudhon's "What is Property" - Ch. 5

Psychological Exposition of the Idea of Justice, and a Determination of the Principle of Government and of Right

Intro: Thoughts on Chapter 5

My notes on chapter 4 can be read here. What is Property can be read here.

We come to the end of Proudhon’s What is Property, and he brings us back to many of the ideas covered in chapter 1: Man errs because he learns. This is a constant emphasis throughout this chapter. Having seen that property is incompatible with occupancy or labor, the focus here is on why we have not yet defeated this “impossibility.” As part of this, he develops an elaborate theory of social psychology, and with that provides, like the first chapter, a kind of narrativized view of history as the growth and development away from these mistaken systems of early society towards one more fully developed and flourishing.

This narrativization brings with it almost a sense of determinism, although this is more fully associated with the works of Marx. If we see humanity as developing this way, the early mistakes and the despotism that came with it were unavoidable. It’s a picture clearly working with ideas pulled from Enlightenment rationality.

Beginning with the first part focused on the development of our idea of justice, Proudhon divides this into three sections.

The first focuses on the existence of our moral sense, and especially connecting this as a kind of basic instinct shared with many other animals. This becomes the groundwork for what Proudhon calls “sociability,” but I think might be better expressed as “love.” Proudhon actually recommends that name as an alternative at one point, along with benevolence, pity, or sympathy. This may reveal why he goes with the name sociability though, as it does include various kinds of “sympathetic attraction.” If we use “love” instead, it should be understood in a similarly broad way, including the kind of love we may feel for a perfect stranger.

This section has a lot of fun poking at the idea that justice and human morality is meant to be this divine thing, a huge division between man and beast. Proudhon dislikes such absolutes, and has fun pointing out that the most obvious and courageous moral actions we might do, like rescuing someone from certain death, is an attribute we share with other animals. They too feel love for their children and those they see in distress. Because of this, Proudhon claims that there is, at the root, no difference in kind between our morality and theirs, and only one of degrees.

As he goes on, it becomes clear that these “degrees” include some actions of which we are capable and which other creatures are categorically incapable. Why not then say there really is a difference in kind? Presumably because this is only achieved so long as we share this same base, upon which other things are only being added. Love is at the root. As Proudhon points out within this section, we do add onto this basic instinct by our power of reflection, letting us apply it in more situations and more exactly, but this does not change the nature of the underlying action anymore than it distinguishes the way we eat from other animals.

Moving on to Part 1, Section 2, Proudhon elaborates more on this “second degree” of sociability built upon the first: Love and Justice.

Proudhon had defined justice as the respect and observation of right, which are the principles governing society. It is important to remember here that “society” for Proudhon is closely tied in with this underlying feeling of love and equality. It is not merely a matter of “legal” rights. Things like property cannot be right precisely because they are anti-social and impossible. Right is therefore a matter of “social order,” and opposed to chaos and disorder. This is the sense in which right works as a governing principle of society.

This is emphasized explicitly in this section. As demonstrated in previous sections, all are associated, since we live by the labor of all. The more the world becomes interconnected, the more true this is. As associates, our relations must be reciprocal and equal. Thus we are led to an idea of equal possession, where all is shared by all, but also lets us recognize property as opposing this. The proprietor quite literally sets themselves outside of and opposed to society.

Proudhon emphasizes this as an inherent identity between equality, sociability, and justice. Justice has this idea of equality, recognizing people as associates, and thanks to our social instinct consciously applies this in our relation with others, as well as letting us identify who is opposed to this equality as our enemies.

Proudhon does add in an interesting caveat here for special relations. While all are equal, this equality also comes from our association. We are all associated, so these basic duties are extended to all. But there is no issue forming special societies between friends and family which can add additional duties along with it, so long as we do not violate our general duties in the process.

Because justice is a power of this kind of conscious recognition of these principles of right, Proudhon associates it more strongly with intelligence, although he does not entirely exclude it from the animals either who must have some awareness of what they are doing, even if they cannot articulate it. Proudhon associates the development of justice then with the development of intelligence, as well as the justice of the laws of nations. Given the rest of the argument here and his lack of specificity, I do not think there is an inherent issue with this if interpreted charitably, but it’s hard to overlook a potential reading of a dismissal of “savages” as “unintelligent” without also thinking of the context of European colonialism.

Section 3 adds in a final degree of sociability which goes beyond love and justice: Equity. Because of the complexity of human society, and the much greater difference of abilities and specializations, it becomes more possible for individuals to become distinguished in society. This is often presented as a contrast of the strong against the weak or the genius against the simple, although this complexity means this should be understood within particular contexts. Someone who might be distinguished in one way might be average in another.

Given that we are meant to build society around equality, how should we approach the exceptional? Proudhon tries to solve this by developing a theory of credit and debt for the assistance we may give or receive without threatening the underlying system. That this is built on top of the other degrees of sociability is crucial for understanding this, since it puts up a natural limit, and directs Proudhon towards his answer: inequality of esteem. While someone can and should be praised for great works of strength, this does not entitle them to greater privileges compared to others. Works of heroism are done here gratuitously, voluntarily adopted to go beyond their equal duty.

The motivation for such self-sacrifice is found in the ultimate unpayable debt we all owe society. The strong are only able to achieve this thanks to that complexity of society and the support it provides us. The strong therefore act out of a kind of gratitude of their own, while those assisted by them likewise give their own gratitude for the strong. There is even in this then a kind of reciprocity, despite what looks like an inequality. This ties in pretty heavily with an idea Proudhon had discussed previously on the inequality of wages based on skill or capacity.

This expands the idea of equity out more, presenting it as a kind of general politeness and recognition of others. Equity is essentially about the distribution of this esteem given to people. For the strong, it is generosity. In the weak, it is gratitude. And between equals, it is friendship of the greatest quality.

While this is a very fine section and idea, it is also followed up with some of Proudhon’s more questionable comments. Since this kind of esteem requires greater intelligence and is built on previous forms of association, Proudhon tries to find the limits of this moral idea.

He essentially just asserts that this kind of relation can only exist between members of the same species, precluding us from being in society with other animals or God. However, I do not think this actually follows from any of his arguments. If anything, by conceding that there may be “affection” across species, this claim needs a lot more work. It is not hard to show that we are not associated with other animals to the same degree we are with other people, as Proudhon has pretty clearly laid out. But nothing of this precludes any relation or kind of society. We might not be able to achieve the same level of reciprocity, but do we have no degree of it? If we do not, as Proudhon argues in the case of the shepherd, is that not a deliberate choice we have made, just like the proprietor has decided to stand outside society?

Especially in vegan anarchism, the kind of society we are building with animals becomes much more deeply explored. To quote the anarchist geographer Elisée Reclus’s “On Vegetarianism” (1901):

The horse and the cow, the rabbit and the cat, the deer and the hare, the pheasant and the lark, please us better as friends than as meat. We wish to preserve them either as respected fellow-workers, or simply as companions in the joy of life and friendship.

My own thoughts as a vegan do see some degree of legitimacy here. I do not think we can form the kind of formal social organizations, such as a federation or a cooperative, with animals, and this does imply a different kind of society. But it is not no society, and we absolutely can and should, motivated by love, oppose the unjust cruelties imposed upon animals.

The points around God are similarly questionable. By most Western philosophical notions of God, it is true that we do not attribute the passions directly to God, and it is considered wrong to attribute anything to God, including things like love or goodness. This idea is especially seen in apophatic (negative) theology, and works precisely because God is so far beyond us that we can only describe them in terms of what they are not because they surpassed it. Assuming God exists then, which Proudhon had asserted back in chapter 1, it would be true that God does not associate with us in a human way, but perhaps could be said to have an even grander relation that goes beyond this.

Proudhon seems to be partly motivated here by the desire to dismiss things like the claim of the divine right of kings. He asserts that if God did come to earth, the same rules of association would apply to God. To be associated is to be equal, and even God could not have it both ways. We might think this is something referencing something like the incarnation of Jesus, but the context seems much more like a dismissal of monarchs that claim to be divine representatives. Even if that were true, they must still be our equals as associates, and would not gain special privileges from this.

The most disturbing comments of all though absolutely come from a footnote in this section. Despite Proudhon very plainly asserting this association must exist between members of the same species, he adds in an extra division without any argument to exclude women from society. It is a disgustingly sexist comment that only seems to be included because Proudhon wanted to talk about all the things he thought could not join society: God, animals, and women.

Shawn Wilbur has some more comments on this section in his own Notes on What Is Property which covers some of the ways Proudhon’s thoughts on women changed and developed throughout his life. While he remained staunchly anti-feminist and deeply sexist, it at least could expand on the exact nature of the error for what here appears as something he simply assumed the audience would accept without question. I am morbidly curious on precisely how far he took this. How exactly would injustices committed against women work, if they are excluded from society? Does he simply deny the possibility of this? Perhaps confronting issues like this is what led him to apparently change his views on women over the years, although this is a change from one sexist theory to another.

As I hope I have made clear, this is quite a repugnant footnote that not only was unnecessary to be added, but actively seems to contradict the other parts of his argument. Even if we accepted Proudhon’s argument around excluding animals or God, which strikes me as questionable on their own, he gives up even the pretense of an argument here. I hope this emphasizes the ways in which we need to especially be critical of Proudhon. I believe its “tacked on” nature also shows the ways in which his main argument can still be engaged and analyzed while it is dismissed. This strikes more as a case being made by someone who also happens to be sexist, rather than sexism being foundational to the argument itself.

Moving on, this section ends with a rather nice section declaring opposition to error and a defense of science, which leads us into the second part of this chapter. An especially important point I make here is also that, while the translation I’m using has Proudhon opposing property to “communism” in the next part, this seems to be more accurately translated as “community.” Proudhon is using the French communauté rather than communisme. It is perhaps not exactly the same idea as communism itself, especially as might be seen by later communist anarchists, but I don’t think it is entirely disconnected either. Proudhon is writing this before Marx rose to any kind of prominence, so even if communism is in mind here, it would be of a very different variety, such as was seen in figures like François-Noël Babeuf and his plans for a new government.

In the first section of part 2, Proudhon considers why property still exists given these issues. As I indicated above, this comes down to the fact that man errs and must learn, building up from a place of ignorance. This inspires the next section where he gives his narrative of this development.

Section 2 begins with the question of community/communism, but what is recognized here as a kind of “negative” community, which appears to be something like primitive communism. This kind of community is dismissed as, ironically, a kind of property of its own, despite being so regularly considered the opposite of property. As Proudhon describes it, it is property, but with the community as the proprietor and owning all individuals within it. There is no space for individual liberty then. It only works in a kind of simple society though, presumably as this is what lets the weak overpower the strong. But with complexity comes the basis for inequality of talent and ability, as discussed above regarding equity. With this inequality developed the system of property, built on the idea of the “right of the strongest.”

Along with this, Proudhon considers the various types of robbery, apparently ranking it from the most brazen and obvious to the most hidden. Along with this, he traces shifting attitudes towards these forms of robbery, as the most obvious forms of “might makes right” become more dismissed, and the more intellectualized and hidden forms of fraud are praised

Proudhon loves connecting this depiction with a pseudo-historical mythology. In one of my favorite comparisons, he locates these two ideas in Homer’s Iliad and the Odyssey, representing force and trickery respectively. This section is full of that, connecting types of robbery or praise for robbery to different mythological or pseudo-historical figures found especially in Greek mythology or the Bible.

With this we also have a sense of how, according to Proudhon’s thesis, increasing intelligence and science comes with these changes in social attitudes. The chaos of property is recognized and resisted more and more, causing uprising in empires especially among the proletariat. Proudhon believes this will ultimately lead us to rejecting this kind of authority entirely as people grow up and are able to make decisions for themselves, rather than needing direction from another.

When we get to Proudhon’s declaration that he is an anarchist then, this is perhaps surprisingly presented as a form of government for the future. He even describes it as “scientific socialism,” a term Proudhon coined that would be quickly appropriated by Marx and Engels. Proudhon expounds quite a bit here on what this radical shift in government would look like where people, being free and intelligent, make their own decisions since the only “legislation” they need is scientific proof. This may not be possible within the chaos and confusion of property, but in a system of social harmony it is not only reasonable but necessary.

The language around authority is also clearly forming up here. While Proudhon at one point discusses the possibility of “legitimate authority,” what we see here is that authority is diminishing precisely as science grows and we need to turn to leaders and experts less. Given my own exploration of anarchist thought about authority in Read On Authority, it is interesting to see how this ties into later comments like what we see in Bakunin. In the next section, he even equates anarchy with “law” within a broader system of liberty.

In the final section Proudhon wishes to combine the strengths of the systems of property and community together, giving us a system of Liberty built on equality, law, independence, and proportionality. Throughout this work, we have seen Proudhon emphasize how even incorrect theories try to grasp for the truth. This was done in the first chapter with the example of scientific theories on the shape of the earth, and even in discussion of property of how it was, at its best, a failed attempt to achieve equality. Proudhon takes that to its logical conclusion here in taking what he finds is correct in this system, and throwing out the rest, and therefore the system of property with it and its right of increase.

We end with 10 principles established by Proudhon that do not exactly give us the full description of the system of the new society, but Proudhon denied that he was here to build any systems in the first chapter. Instead, we have some general principles summarizing his conclusions from this critique, and what it must imply about the system of Liberty.

Summary of Chapter V: Psychological Exposition of the Idea of Justice, and a Determination of the Principle of Government and of Right

Intro

Property is impossible, yet equality does not exist.

We hate property, yet wish to possess it.

Equality rules all our thoughts, yet we do not know how to reach it.

Why is there this conflict? How has error become a sacred principle of justice?

To understand why justice has been violated, we must first understand the nature of justice itself.

Part 1

1. Of the Moral Sense in Man and the Animals

What distinguishes us from the brute animals? Philosophers gave many foolish answers before turning to the only reliable method: observation. The answer so wisely given by Frederic Cuvier (1773-1838) was to distinguish between instinct and intelligence.

But no one has asked this question yet: Is the difference between the moral senses of humans and animals a difference of kind or degree?

Most people like to say that it is different in kind. Humanity is special and elevated above animals. To say there is only a mere difference in degree is considered blasphemous. It would be degrading to man, the lord of creation, to say our most noble attributes are shared with beasts.

But what is so special about man’s moral sense?

Aristotle defined man as a rational and social animal. This is a fine definition. Man must indeed live in society, a system of social relationships. By understanding the conditions in which society exists, we can learn about the laws that govern human society.

Many have grasped this, but failed to define what justice really is. Either their language is flowery yet lacking substance, or it describes a mere truism like saying that justice is “socially useful.”

Proudhon offers his own definitions.

• Right is the sum total of the principles which govern society.

• Justice, in man, is the respect and observation of these principles.

Justice is therefore inherently social. To practice justice is to obey the social instinct. To act justly is to do a social act.

We can see this in a few clear examples of justice, which no one can dispute:

• A mother risking her life to save her children.

• Rescuing a man drowning in water.

• Giving alms to the poor.

• The Good Samaritan.

Each of these cases shares a common theme: love of our fellows. Someone who abandons their children, drowns someone, robs them, or acts like the priest who walked by behaves not as an associate, but as an enemy.

Yet we share these clear cases of justice with the animals! They too feel sympathy and love, protecting their young, working in packs, rescuing others when calling out in distress, etc. There is no difference in kind between us here, only one of degree. Ironically, man at our most godlike in acts of charity and justice is really acting on animal instinct.

Yet there is still some difference between us.

Some would say it is that, unlike the animals, we are conscious of this instinct. We can reflect and reason about our actions in a way other creatures cannot.

Proudhon goes further. We can recognize injustice as not only injurious to others, but also ourselves by resisting the governing social instinct we call justice. This reflection is also what gives us a sense of responsibility, and therefore a concept of remorse, revenge, and penalty.

But is this a difference of kind or degree?

Being able to reflect on morality doesn’t change its nature. We can also reason about eating and drinking, yet no one would claim we are different from animals in this respect. While we have superior knowledge of good and evil, and therefore greater ideas of dissatisfaction, indignation, and what is due to people, the power of reflection alone does not categorically distinguish us from the beasts.

2. Of the First and Second Degrees of Sociability

If there is a difference in degree, what do the different degrees look like?

On the first and most basic level, we have this idea of sympathetic attraction. It is love, benevolence, pity, the basic impulse to seek others out. This is our basic drive for companionship and association, which we share with the animals.

The second degree of sociability is justice, which may be defined as “the recognition of the equality between another’s personality and our own.” We also share this with animals, although we have a more exact idea of it.

There is also a third degree which goes even beyond this, which we will return to later.

Society, equality, and justice are metaphysically identical. Wherever we find one, we find the other two.

Take our previous example of a drowning man. Amid a shipwreck, I am able to escape on a small boat with some provisions. I see someone drowning and can easily assist them. Am I bound to rescue them? Certainly, or else I would be a murderer.

But must I also share my provisions with them? Again, the answer is clearly yes. If our social duties are binding on the boat, then surely it binds the provisions as well. It would be ridiculous to say we must save someone from the water, only to starve them once on board! Possession may only be exclusive when permission to occupy is given to all.

But people object here. “What! I must share my bread I earned with a stranger? One who I may never see again or might be ungrateful? If we earned this bread together, they may claim their share, but without that why should they have any claim against me? We have not produced together — we shall not eat together.”

This argument fails because it assumes not all workers are associated.

In society, everyone is in association with everyone else. If two people associate to fish together, and one catches no fish, they are still entitled to a share of what was caught together, as they were producing not merely for themselves, but for society. Distribution considers people as associates then, not as producers.

In a twisted way, this is why slave-masters and capitalists disregard the slave and wageworker when distributing the product. Even if they work besides them, they are not associated with them. Instead they are treated like animals, and anything given to them is seen as an act of benevolence.

Are we all associated then? Consider our analysis from the last two chapters. Even if we did not wish to associate, the laws of production and exchange necessitate it. The only exception to this rule is the proprietor. Producing by the right of increase, they are associated with no one, and therefore are not obliged to share with anyone.

No association can exist without equality. It follows that to violate society is also to violate justice and equality.

We may apply this same principle of association to society at large. Each may be secure in their equal right of possession, but as associates they may not force someone to work on their behalf, or take from society without also contributing. In society, things are reciprocal.

By this principle, the man who takes possession of a field, and says, “This field is mine,” will not be unjust so long as every one else has an equal right of possession; nor will he be unjust, if, wishing to change his location, he exchanges this field for an equivalent. But if, putting another in his place, he says to him, “Work for me while I rest,” he then becomes unjust, unassociated, unequal. He is a proprietor.

Reciprocally, the sluggard, or the rake, who, without performing any social task, enjoys like others — and often more than others — the products of society, should be proceeded against as a thief and a parasite. We owe it to ourselves to give him nothing; but, since he must live, to put him under supervision, and compel him to labor.

This gives us a clearer understanding of society, justice, and equality.

Sociability is the attraction sentient beings feel towards one another. Justice is this same attraction, but accompanied by thought and knowledge. Specifically, it is part of our understanding of equality. Thus we have the ancient definition of justice: “Justum æquale est, injustum inæquale” [The just is equal, the unjust unequal.]

From this, we make several conclusions.

Practicing justice means giving equal shares of wealth to each, on condition of equal labor. The right of occupancy means this claim adjusts according to the number of laborers, although even this claim is subordinate to the social interest. The right of labor is the right to obtain one’s share of the wealth, having fulfilled the appropriate condition.

What is it, then, to practise justice? It is to give equal wealth to each, on condition of equal labor. It is to act socially. Our selfishness may complain; there is no escape from evidence and necessity.

What is the right of occupancy? It is a natural method of dividing the earth, by reducing each laborer’s share as fast as new laborers present themselves. This right disappears if the public interest requires it; which, being the social interest, is also that of the occupant.

What is the right of labor? It is the right to obtain one’s share of wealth by fulfilling the required conditions. It is the right of society, the right of equality.

Justice is the product of combining an idea (of equality) with an instinct (of sociability). It manifests within us as soon as we are capable of both. Because of this, many consider our sense of justice to be innate. That is incorrect, but justice as a combination of intellect and emotion does seem to be strong proof of the unity and simplicity of the ego.

Realizing this double-basis of justice helps to explain the basis of our argument in the last three chapters.

Justice is identical with society and equality. Any defense of property as a just social institution must therefore ultimately appeal to equality. Since property is an inequality, this necessarily leads it into a contradiction, defending the unequal as equal. This was seen in chapters 2 and 3.

Further, equality relies on mathematical proportion. But property, depending on the unequal distribution of wealth, disrupts the necessary balance between labor, consumption, and production. Property is therefore impossible, as seen in chapter 4.

We see then that all are associated as equals, and therefore entitled to justice.

How then should we account for special treatment given to family and friends? Is that unjust? Certainly not, precisely because we are in special societies with them.

If there are two people in need of help and we can only help one, not only is it not unjust to help the person we know, it is actively good. Thus we can show preference to our parents, children, friends, relatives, etc.

This has limits though. For example, a judge settling a case may not ignore the evidence to show favoritism towards their friends. Preferences can only be shown in personal matters, without violating the general equality.

This highlights how human justice expands animal justice. Animal justice tends to be negative, focused on preventing harm. There is little intimacy in them, due to a weaker memory.

Human justice is more deliberate thanks to our greater memory and judgment, allowing us to be more exact in applying justice.

If we trace the development of the moral sense in individuals, and the progress of laws in nations, we shall be convinced that the ideas of justice and legislative perfection are always proportional to intelligence.

But still we are only dealing in matters of degrees here. We have added understanding to justice, but we have not changed its fundamental nature.

3. Of the Third Degree of Sociability

Humanity has a diversity of talents, divided up by Nature according to what we collectively need. We rarely need the talent of a genius in this or that specialty, so one is rarely found. This same level of diversity is not found in the animals. They generally have very similar skill levels for finding food, building nests, avoiding enemies, etc. Humans are constantly in communication with others, not only sharing products and services, but ideas and feelings. Human society can therefore be considered complex in a way that animal society is simple.

This complexity is also what allows society, although being built on equality, to develop a healthy sense of debt and credit. In the strong, this is generosity. Between friends, it is friendship. In the weak, it is admiration and gratitude.

The person superior in strength, skill, or courage may practice generosity precisely because they know they are indebted to society, without which this strength would be impossible. By treating them as an equal, society fulfills its entire duty. Out of “voluntary reverence” for humanity then, they are moved to a higher degree of social morality, laboring gratuitously for the benefit of all. Here we see the virtue and justice of heroes of myth like Hercules and Orpheus, who slayed monsters without putting a price on their services. This is the joy of self-sacrifice.

The weak similarly adore the strong and sing their praises. These humble masses may yet find their own kind of strength in numbers, allowing them to carry out the plans of some visionary. They are guided by them, but owe them nothing. They only give honor in return. Gratitude fills people with adoration and enthusiasm.

But it is equality that really delights us.

Benevolence degenerates into tyranny, and admiration into servility. Friendship is the daughter of equality. O my friends! may I live in your midst without emulation, and without glory; let equality bring us together, and fate assign us our places. May I die without knowing to whom among you I owe the most esteem!

Generosity, gratitude, and friendship reveal to us the third degree of sociability: equity (equité) or social proportionality. This does not change justice, but rather superadds esteem onto it. It is “the just distribution of social sympathy and universal love.” Equity makes it our duty and pleasure to help those in need to make them our equals, and allows us to pay the strong without becoming enslaved to them. Most commonly, it takes the form of simply being polite. It is a result of combining intelligence and love.

Sociability, justice, and equity are all mutually supportive. Equity cannot exist without justice, and justice cannot exist without sociability. Justice expands on society, introducing equality in the material division of things which can be measured. Equity expands on justice with admiration and esteem on things which cannot be measured.

From this we can conclude several things.

Firstly, we can see that justice takes precedence over equity. While we may show inequality of esteem, we may not permit inequality of wealth. This would violate justice, the very foundation which equity is built on.

Applying this to matters like inheritance, we may see it as proper for a son to take over the family business that they are well suited for, and find it proper that someone may pick their successor. But society cannot tolerate the concentration of wealth. The right of the inheritor may be the first choice among options which maintain equality.

Justice and equity are frequently misunderstood. Toullier supposed that justice was a matter of geometrical proportionality. Achilles is twice as strong as Ajax, then by this reasoning Achilles would deserve twice the spoils. But this inequality of wealth would violate justice.

Secondly, we can see the limits of sociability. Sociability, justice, and equity may only exist between members of the same species. There cannot be any such relation between men and animals, nor between man and God.

We should not anthropomorphize God, who lacks passions, by attributing justice, equity, and love to him. God could only be justice, equitable, or good to another God. He is not in association with us, and therefore experiences these social affections.

Likewise, we are not in association with animals. We may have affection for them, but do not view them as persons.

Proudhon then makes these extremely sexist comments in a footnote:

Between woman and man there may exist love, passion, ties of custom, and the like; but there is no real society. Man and woman are not companions. The difference of the sexes places a barrier between them, like that placed between animals by a difference of race. Consequently, far from advocating what is now called the emancipation of woman, I should incline, rather, if there were no other alternative, to exclude her from society.

The rights of woman and her relations with man are yet to be determined Matrimonial legislation, like civil legislation, is a matter for the future to settle.

No additional argument is given for this wild and baffling assertion, and it is a clear example of Proudhon’s extreme anti-feminism. Proudhon is arguing that real sociability is only possible among creatures which are sufficiently alike. Despite saying that this is possible among members of the same species, he arbitrarily carves out an exception for women, asserting that the difference is simply still too great for some unstated reason.

As this was left to a footnote, he immediately returns to speaking about God.

For God to associate with us, he would need to become man, and even then would only be able to demand his equal share. Kings then, as the so-called images of God on Earth, may similarly only claim equality.

This brings us to our final point: having demonstrated the existence of so much injustice, we must take action.

Equality of conditions has never been realized, despite it being the natural conclusion of everything we analyzed. Jurisprudence demonstrates it according to right and duty. Political economy demonstrates it as the due reward of talent and labor. Psychology demonstrates it according to love and enthusiasm.

This failure is due to passion and ignorance, which society must continually overcome. The periodic revolutions seen in empires are not coincidences. The fight against property is the cause of all revolutions, most clearly seen in the fight of the proletariat. Throughout history, empires became corrupted by property, usury, bankers, and markets. Their failure demonstrates the clear fate of the regime of property.

We have demonstrated the right of the poor against the usurpation of the rich. We must not delay in enforcing this right, no matter how it disturbs the wealthy. The welfare of the oppressed is more important than official composure and the anxieties of power. The government must be reconstructed immediately on the basis of equality.

The focus here really is focused on building, not destruction. We have destroyed the groundwork of property by laying the foundation for equality. But this is a science we have only just begun, and like all human sciences, will always remain incomplete.

To this end, Proudhon has dedicated himself to the destruction of error.

For my part, I have sworn fidelity to my work of demolition, and I will not cease to pursue the truth through the ruins and rubbish. I hate to see a thing half done; and it will be believed without any assurance of mine, that, having dared to raise my hand against the Holy Ark, I shall not rest contented with the removal of the cover. The mysteries of the sanctuary of iniquity must be unveiled, the tables of the old alliance broken, and all the objects of the ancient faith thrown in a heap to the swine. A charter has been given to us, — a résumé of political science, the monument of twenty legislatures. A code has been written, — the pride of a conqueror, and the summary of ancient wisdom. Well! of this charter and this code not one article shall be left standing upon another! The time has come for the wise to choose their course, and prepare for reconstruction.

But this destruction also implies the existence of some truth.

What will the new society be then? Will it be communauté?

(NB: Communauté was translated by Tucker here as communism, although it more directly translates to community. Shawn Wilbur had some comments on this in his Notes on “What is Property?” In line with this, I will replace references to communism with community.)

Part 2

1. Of the Causes of Our Mistakes. The Origin of Property

If property is so unnatural, why is it so widespread? How has our social instinct failed so badly when it is so reliable in other animals?

Let’s first examine this within the complexity of human society, which is made up of many different talents and capacities, and therefore with different wills and desires. This leads to conflict in a way we do not see in animal society. If men were to function like bees, we would all do our part and fulfill our role in society, but without understanding. The power of reason also gives us the power to err according to our private opinions.

Man errs because he learns.

Thus, moral evil, or, in this case, disorder in society, is naturally explained by our power of reflection. The mother of poverty, crime, insurrection, and war was inequality of conditions; which was the daughter of property, which was born of selfishness, which was engendered by private opinion, which descended in a direct line from the autocracy of reason. Man, in his infancy, is neither criminal nor barbarous, but ignorant and inexperienced. Endowed with imperious instincts which are under the control of his reasoning faculty, at first he reflects but little, and reasons inaccurately; then, benefiting by his mistakes, he rectifies his ideas, and perfects his reason.

As social beings, we seek equality in relations. Yet we love independence and praise. The difficulty in satisfying both desires has produced despotism. The practice of justice destroys this ignorance and social disorder by teaching us our rights and duties.

Man is separated from the animals in our power of reflection, allowing us to change ourselves and our instincts. Instinct provides us with our source of passion and enthusiasm, but intellect is the source of crime and virtue both. Evil is the firstborn of reason, since we must start in a place of ignorance. But with experience we gain knowledge and virtue.

Property has become entrenched in human society in this way. Humanity, in early society, blindly grasped towards community in a very basic mode of sharing. But with experience, we developed industry, allowing property to supersede the old system of “negative community”.

We can express this in a Hegelian formula: Community, as the first expression of our social nature, is the thesis. Property, the reverse of community, is the antithesis. We will find our solution in the synthesis which corrects the errors of both, eliminating the features hostile to sociability.

(NB: This is not an accurate presentation of Hegel’s theory of immanent critique. That is not how dialectics work.)

2. Characteristics of Community and of Property

Let’s first examine community.

Property and community have long been considered the only possible forms of society. Property has frequently argued against equality by presenting a farce of community, imagining it must imply slavery.

Really, “community” can be understood as another system of property, but with the community as the property owner. The community owns all, including its members, and strictly enforces passive obedience, prohibits private associations, and forces the strong to serve the weak.

If property upholds inequality through force, with the strong exploiting the weak, community upholds mediocrity. It goes beyond the equality of conditions demanded by justice and also demands as a right what in equity is presented as freely-given generosity.

Community violates our conscience and equality by restricting our spontaneity of free thought and action, and by placing laziness and vice as the equivalents to virtue.

If property is impossible because of the desire to accumulate, community is impossible because of the desire to shirk.

Having said that, we can now consider property itself.

Property violates equality and freedom by robbery and despotism. We have explored this thoroughly in the last three chapters, and here will prove its ultimate identity with robbery.

As we can see in various languages, the robber is a man who conceals or diverts a thing which does not belong to them. They violate the eighth commandment, thou shalt not steal, holding back something meant to be shared, or taking the lion’s share for themselves.

Robbery is committed in many ways.

At the most basic level, there is brazen robbery by force and open fraud. This includes:

1. Highway murder

2. Direct theft

3. Breaking into buildings

4. Abstraction [Unauthorized withdrawal from someone else’s account]

5. Fraudulent bankruptcy

6. Forgery

7. Counterfeit money.

In ancient times, this type of robbery was praised as the acts of ancient heroes in Greek and Biblical stories. But today we treat these bandits much more harshly.

Beyond this, there is robbery by wit. This includes:

8. Cheating

9. Swindling

10. Abuse of trust

11. Games and lotteries.

The praise of this kind of robbery is also seen in ancient heroic figures presented as “tricksters.” Even today when the law does punish these actions, it is treated as the less disgraceful method of theft.

Then we come to a crucial method of robbery:

12. Usury.

This is the connecting link between forbidden and authorized robbery. It is condemned by the gospels, but defended by the lawyers. It is institutionalized in banking. The idea is so twisted that we sometimes only condemn something as “usury” at particularly high rates of interest (e.g. more than 10%), or when the interest piles on for over a year instead of the short-term. Moderation in robbery is the height of virtue!

This brings us to the more fully authorized forms of robbery by lending things other than money:

13. Farm-rent, house-rent, and leases of all kinds.

Seventeenth century Christians debated this, rightly realizing its connection with usury, and therefore debating whether they must both be accepted or rejected together.

Even more removed is this:

14. Commerce.

Commerce here is the skill of buying something for less than it is worth, or selling it for more than it is worth. It is robbery by another name, and close connected to another form:

15. Profit on our product.

This is done through people accepting sinecures (offices without responsibilities, giving it an easy salary) or taking exorbitant wages.

In summary, we see that things have been replaced in stages. We began with the negative community of the so-called “golden age,” but then moved into one built around the “right of the strongest.” By organizing this society, the inequality of abilities developed an idea of merit, and therefore also one of equity. But this distributed not only esteem, but also material wealth according to ability. As the most recognized ability then was still physical strength, this remained a “right of the strongest,” who takes it by force if it is denied.

This was the “justice” of the age of heroes, preserved for us in myth. This is also represented in Plato’s Gorgias by the character Callicles, who debates against Socrates, the defender of equality.

From this right of the strongest we get exploitation, bondage, usury, tributes levied on conquered nations, taxes, duties, monarchical prerogatives, house-rent, farm-rent, etc. In a word: Property.

This age of force was replaced by an age of artifice, the second manifestation of justice, upholding trickery and mental force over the physical. From this we got profit, commerce, banking, fraud, and so many people honored as “geniuses” who are just con artists. All sorts of social inequalities were born from this.

In those forms of robbery which are prohibited by law, force and artifice are employed alone and undisguised; in the authorized forms, they conceal themselves within a useful product, which they use as a tool to plunder their victim.

The right of force and the right of artifice, so well represented in Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, shaped Greek and Roman morals and laws. Christianity failed to change this, not by fault of the Gospel but by ignorance of the priests, councils, and popes. All disregarded the precepts of Jesus to rush to the preaching false and absurd dogmas while upholding wickedness and murder. The clergy prefers to live by property. This is also true of the Protestant clergy, as seen in the suffering of Ireland which is primarily caused by the English.

With this, we have shown the identity of property with robbery, tracing its history and various forms. But this is only the first effect of property. The second effect is despotism. To better understand this, we can contrast it to legitimate authority.

What is to be the form of government in the future? hear some of my younger readers reply: “Why, how can you ask such a question? You are a republican.” “A republican! Yes; but that word specifies nothing. Res publica; that is, the public thing. Now, whoever is interested in public affairs — no matter under what form of government — may call himself a republican. Even kings are republicans.” —

“Well! you are a democrat?” — “No.” — “What! you would have a monarchy.” — “No.” — “A constitutionalist?” — “God forbid!” — “You are then an aristocrat?” — “Not at all.” — “You want a mixed government?” — “Still less.” — “What are you, then?” — “I am an anarchist.”

“Oh! I understand you; you speak satirically. This is a hit at the government.” — “By no means. I have just given you my serious and well-considered profession of faith. Although a firm friend of order, I am (in the full force of the term) an anarchist. Listen to me.”

(NB: This is the first time Proudhon has referred to himself as an anarchist, and generally considered the first time someone has positively identified themselves this way.)

When we look at other animals, we see that the young and weak obey the wise and old. They do this only for matters of intellect though, not for instinct, which they can handle perfectly well on their own. Human chiefs similarly only exist to guide by their enlightened experience. Man, a naturally social being, naturally follows these kinds of leaders.

Anarchy is not the original state of mankind. Despotism is. Royalty is by far the most primitive form of government, even existing within the age of negative community. It was with the despotism of the age of heroes though where we had the first idea of justice, manifesting as the despotic reign of force.

This psychological origin of royalty gives it a kind of superhuman character. Thus the royal lineage was said to have descended from the gods, and there developed a theory of divine right.

However, this royalty was at first elected rather than hereditary. It was only with the growth of property and cities that the monarchy could be inherited. This approach was even carried into the other professions, fixing people to certain stations and class distinctions. This system was occasionally interrupted by “illegitimate” usurpers, but no form of royalty is ever really legitimate to begin with.

The more ignorant we are, the more we need a guide. Beginning in ignorance, monarchy might have been the best of a bad situation. But as we become more enlightened, the more we put it behind us. We begin to learn and to question, and therefore to question authority itself. Reason is the origin of disobedience and rebellion.

If he obeys no longer because the king commands, but because the king demonstrates the wisdom of his commands, it may be said that henceforth he will recognize no authority, and that he has become his own king.

Authority diminishes with the march of progress and science. When there is no sense of justice, the authority of kings is immense. But with experience comes habits and customs which become law which even the king is bound by. The king is more and more made the executive power of a country whose laws are established independently.

Eventually we achieve the idea of science: “a system of knowledge in harmony with the reality of things, and inferred from observation.” Man searches for science in organic matter, the mind, and the universe itself. Why should we not also search for the science of society? This science of politics will exist independently from the will of this or that person or group. Man is a social being, and we set aside the authority of our father when our mind has developed, instead only accepting demonstrated truth. Likewise, the science of politics reduces the function of the legislator down to the methodological search for truth.

The future government then will be the scientific socialism of anarchy.

Thus, in a given society, the authority of man over man is inversely proportional to the stage of intellectual development which that society has reached; and the probable duration of that authority can be calculated from the more or less general desire for a true government, — that is, for a scientific government. And just as the right of force and the right of artifice retreat before the steady advance of justice, and must finally be extinguished in equality, so the sovereignty of the will yields to the sovereignty of the reason, and must at last be lost in scientific socialism. Property and royalty have been crumbling to pieces ever since the world began. As man seeks justice in equality, so society seeks order in anarchy.

Anarchy, — the absence of a master, of a sovereign, — such is the form of government to which we are every day approximating, and which our accustomed habit of taking man for our rule, and his will for law, leads us to regard as the height of disorder and the expression of chaos.

Anarchy is the government of the future which will bring order. It is the rule of sovereign wills which has led us into disorder and chaos.

A strong prejudice has been instilled in us to think things are the opposite. When the people of Paris told citizens of other nations that there was no more king, they laughed at the idea as ridiculous. We must work against this. Many now still call for dictatorship. The more advanced among us call for increasing the number of sovereigns. They will champion “everyone is king.” To this we must reply “no one is king. We are associated.”

Domestic politics will become a matter of statistics, and truth will be the only authority. The science of government will be studied along with the other sciences. Functions lose their political character as every citizen is made a legislator, able to propose their ideas. But no opinion is valued until it is proven. Reason may not be substituted by the will. No one is king.

Politics becomes a question of science, not opinion. Legislation power will belong to reason. There can be no right of veto or sanction. Justice and legality do not depend on our approval. To compel, they only need to be known, which is only achieved through study. The nation is not a sovereign, but rather is executive power. Everyone may make their own claims about truth and justice, but this will only be recognized by proof: verifying equations, repeating experiments, making observations, and establishing facts.

This will strike people as a paradox. But we began with the paradox of property, and if we reason well must end with paradoxes too.

Opposed to this is the proprietor, the robber, the hero, the sovereign. They impose their will as law and do not let themselves be contradicted. They combined executive and legislative power, substituting scientific law for the royal will by a terrible struggle. This is, with property, the source of political disturbances.

Property gives rise to despotism. This is the essence of property. Property is the right of use and abuse. Property and economy are incompatible. If we are associated for production and consumption, then we are not associated for property. If things really are property, then why not let the proprietors be despotic kings? They are the sovereign lords of their spheres, after all.

A government of proprietors could only be chaos and confusion.

3. Determination of the Third Form of Society. Conclusion

Both property and community have elements that aim at good things. Community aims at equality and law, while property aims at independence and proportionality.

But both are ultimately mistaken. Community seeks leveling and uniformity, while property seeks despotism and encroachment.

We need a society which will properly combine equality, law, independence, and proportionality together.

These four principles are compatible with one another.

1. Equality: This is equality of conditions, i.e. of means, not of comfort. The latter must be achieved by the workers themselves, when provided with these equal means. This does not violate justice or equity.

2. Law: This results from knowledge of facts, and is therefore based on necessity and cannot contradict independence.

3. Independence: The autonomous reason of the private individual exists thanks to the difference of abilities, and exists safely within the limits of the law.

4. Proportionality: This is admitted in areas of intelligence and sentiment, but not in material wealth. It therefore does not violate justice or social equality.

We may call the synthesis of these four principles Liberty. This is the balance of rights and duties. To free a man is to put them in balance with others, placing them on the same level.

To achieve this, we do not blindly unite community and property like the eclectics. By our analysis of the truth found in each and disregarding the rest, we find something in harmony with the laws of nature; the natural form of human society - Liberty.

Liberty is equality, because liberty exists only in society; and in the absence of equality there is no society.

Liberty is anarchy, because it does not admit the government of the will, but only the authority of the law; that is, of necessity.

Liberty is infinite variety, because it respects all wills within the limits of the law.

Liberty is proportionality, because it allows the utmost latitude to the ambition for merit, and the emulation of glory.

This is the true basis of our morality. Duty and right are born from our needs. This is a right of others, and a duty for ourselves.

Our need to eat and sleep gives us a right to procure necessary goods. Our need to labor to live gives us our duty to labor. Our need to love our family gives us the right and duty to protect them. Our need to exchange products gives the right to equal exchange. Our need to live our lives according to reason gives us the right to maintain our freedom and the duty to respect the freedom of others. Our need to appreciate our fellows gives us a duty to praise and the right to be judged by our works.

Liberty is not opposed to rights of succession, but only the violation of equality. Our legislation must be remade accordingly.

Liberty favors emulation, and applauds self-sacrifice, but maintains social equilibrium only with justice.

Liberty is essentially an organizing force. To ensure equality, it must distribute its agriculture, industry, education, business, and storage according to the climate, geography, the inhabitants, etc. so that no one has an excess and no one lacks. This is the true science of political economy.

With this work, we have conquered property. Whoever reads it gets the germ of the death of property within them.

We are left with a few conclusions. He emphasizes that we must replace property with individual possession to drive evil from the face of the earth. This is built upon an equal right of occupancy, meaning this possession must vary with the number of occupiers. Further, as proved before in chapter 3, property is destroyed by labor precisely because it is the product of the collective force of all. This is also true for any special skills or capital built up, meaning no inequality of fortune may be established. This new system of liberty will instead recognize the equality of products, and with that the equality of wages when they have equal rights and duties. This likewise makes profit impossible. This system is also premised on free association, and therefore equal access to the means of production. With this science of politics, we will reject the rule over man by man and embrace anarchy.

I. Individual possession is the condition of social life; five thousand years of property demonstrate it. Property is the suicide of society. Possession is a right; property is against right. Suppress property while maintaining possession, and, by this simple modification of the principle, you will revolutionize law, government, economy, and institutions; you will drive evil from the face of the earth.

II. All having an equal right of occupancy, possession varies with the number of possessors; property cannot establish itself.

III. The effect of labor being the same for all, property is lost in the common prosperity.

IV. All human labor being the result of collective force, all property becomes, in consequence, collective and unitary. To speak more exactly, labor destroys property.

V. Every capacity for labor being, like every instrument of labor, an accumulated capital, and a collective property, inequality of wages and fortunes (on the ground of inequality of capacities) is, therefore, injustice and robbery.

VI. The necessary conditions of commerce are the liberty of the contracting parties and the equivalence of the products exchanged. Now, value being expressed by the amount of time and outlay which each product costs, and liberty being inviolable, the wages of laborers (like their rights and duties) should be equal.

VII. Products are bought only by products. Now, the condition of all exchange being equivalence of products, profit is impossible and unjust. Observe this elementary principle of economy, and pauperism, luxury, oppression, vice, crime, and hunger will disappear from our midst.

VIII. Men are associated by the physical and mathematical law of production, before they are voluntarily associated by choice. Therefore, equality of conditions is demanded by justice; that is, by strict social law: esteem, friendship, gratitude, admiration, all fall within the domain of equitable or proportional law only.

IX. Free association, liberty — whose sole function is to maintain equality in the means of production and equivalence in exchanges — is the only possible, the only just, the only true form of society.

X. Politics is the science of liberty. The government of man by man (under whatever name it be disguised) is oppression. Society finds its highest perfection in the union of order with anarchy.

Proudhon also covers in a footnote regarding his first point that “individual possession” here should not be understood as an obstacle for large-scale farming or joint cultivation, the advantages of which he considers obvious. Rather, it is property, not possession, that would be an impediment to this.

The old world of despotism is dying. Proprietors, abandon your property, and embrace the rising tide of popular equality and be reborn! Victims of property, take heart, for your tears are numbered!

Oh God of Liberty and Equality, who has placed this sentiment of justice in our hearts, we write this with the talent you have given us, and wish more for justice than our own fame. We seek the end of property quickly. Inspire horror in the powerful of their own crimes and let them seek redemption. Let the promptness of their repentance be the grounds of their forgiveness. Then let us all sing a new hymn in unison before your altar.

Thus ends Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s What is Property.

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