A Summary of Proudhon's "What is Property" - Ch. 1
Method Pursued in This Work - The Idea of a Revolution
Intro: Thoughts on Proudhon and Chapter 1
My intention here is to provide a plain-language summary of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s What is Property. Before I provide my summary of each chapter, I intend on saying a few words about the chapter, exploring some details or adding some comments that I think would be too out of place in the summary itself. As this is the first chapter, I will also say a few words on Proudhon as a person and thinker.
Proudhon was an extremely important and influential French socialist in the first half of the 19th century. His ideas would have a major impact on all subsequent socialist movements, and marks one of the first great attempts at articulating the ideals of the emancipation of the working classes. Despite this, many of his works remain untranslated today, and what what has been is often unread or is found to be too difficult. To help combat this issue, I have decided to post my own summation of Proudhon’s argument in his most famous work What is Property (1840), which can be read here.
It seems fair to say that, if your average socialist today has any knowledge of Proudhon at all, it tends to break down into four basic points:
Some vague understanding of his connection to anarchism.
Marx denouncing his economic theories, replying to his work The System of Economic Contradictions, or the Philosophy of Poverty with a work titled The Poverty of Philosophy, reversing his title.
The phrase “Property is theft!”
That he was an anti-Semite and a misogynist.
Addressing the last point first, Proudhon’s reactionary attitudes certainly seem to be his most egregious issues, and I have little interest in defending it or him. It is present in his work, and it is repugnant in ways I do not wish to repeat.
As one might expect for someone presenting themselves as a radical defender of liberty and equality, this bigotry runs counter to his actual argument in many ways. In this respect, his hypocrisy fit well within the culture of early 19th century France who spoke so eloquently about universal human rights, only to then champion all the worst forms of oppression. The socialist movement as a whole, including anarchism, has had to struggle with unlearning the oppressive systems of racism, patriarchy, colonialism, etc. within its ranks, even while presenting itself as a fight for human liberation. This is true not only of the past, but of our present, and will continue to be true until these systems are dismantled entirely. This past must not be whitewashed either by pretending these bigoted figures were not part of the movement or by pretending these elements were not part of their work.
An accurate assessment of Proudhon cannot ignore the flaws, and certainly must not defend or excuse them. Proper engagement would require critical reading, knowing where these biases exist, and allowing us to better identify them when they appear. The same rule applies when studying other philosophers as well like Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, or Friedrich Hegel. For this reason, I will not erase Proudhon’s bigotry where it appears in his work, but instead clearly call it to attention. Indeed, the entire socialist movement, then and now, must unlearn these behaviors.
As for Proudhon’s relationship to anarchism, things are a bit more complex. Certainly he was one of the first people to loudly and proudly identify as an anarchist and present anarchism as a coherent system. However, Proudhon’s supporters identified mainly as supporting the system of “mutualism.” The more readily identifiable anarchist movement born from the First International was largely distinct from these mutualists, butting heads with them over questions like the collectivization of land at the 1869 Basel Congress or the need for an insurrectionary revolution. For someone often presented as the father of anarchism then, there is a somewhat surprising distance between Proudhon and the anarchist movement. Perhaps this could be argued to be a split between a left-wing and a right-wing of mutualism, but the distinction is interesting regardless.
Proudhon is generally also believed to not have maintained his commitment to anarchism throughout his life. The French anarchist Daniel Guerin describes this later development like this in Anarchism: From Theory to Practice:
[I]n the second part of his career Proudhon’s thinking took a conservative turn. His verbose and monumental De la Justice dans la Revolution et dans l’Eglise (1858) was mainly concerned with the problem of religion and its conclusion was far from libertarian. In the end, in spite of passionate anti-clericalism, he accepted all the categories of Catholicism, subject to his own interpretations, proclaimed that the instruction and moral training of the people would benefit from the preservation of Christian symbolism, and in his final words seemed almost ready to say a prayer. Respect for his memory inhibits all but a passing reference to his “salute to war,” his diatribes against women, or his fits of racism.
As for Marx’s relation to Proudhon, I have done enough research to know I have not done enough research into all of its complexity. Proudhon was especially influential on Marx’s early career, praising his work quite strongly. Marx and Engels’ first joint writing project was their 1845 work The Holy Family, they had this to say about Proudhon, and especially this work What is Property:
Not only does Proudhon write in the interest of the proletarians, he is himself a proletarian, an ouvrier [worker]. His work [What is Property] is a scientific manifesto of the French proletariat and therefore has quite a different historical significance from that of the literary botch-work of any Critical Critic.
This is quite high praise from the typically so caustic Marx. While he largely soured on Proudhon later in life, his high opinion of What is Property appears to have remained. After Proudhon died in January 1865, Marx wrote a letter J. B. Schweizer where he had this to say:
His first work, Qu’est-ce que la propriété? [What is Property], is undoubtedly his best. It is epoch-making, if not because of the novelty of its content, at least because of the new and audacious way of expressing old ideas. In the works of the French socialists and communists he knew “propriété” had, of course, been not only criticised in various ways but also “abolished” in a utopian manner. In this book Proudhon stands in approximately the same relation to Saint-Simon and Fourier as Feuerbach stands to Hegel. Compared with Hegel, Feuerbach is certainly poor. Nevertheless he was epoch-making after Hegel because he laid stress on certain points which were disagreeable to the Christian consciousness but important for the progress of criticism, points which Hegel had left in mystic clair-obscur [semi-obscurity].
In this book of Proudhon’s there still prevails, if I may be allowed the expression, a strong muscular style. And its style is in my opinion its chief merit. It is evident that even where he is only reproducing old stuff, Proudhon discovers things in an independent way – that what he is saying is new to him and is treated as new. The provocative defiance, which lays hands on the economic “holy of holies,” the ingenious paradox which made a mock of the ordinary bourgeois understanding, the withering criticism, the bitter irony, and, revealed here and there, a deep and genuine feeling of indignation at the infamy of the existing order, a revolutionary earnestness – all these electrified the readers of Qu’est-ce que la propriété? and provided a strong stimulus on its first appearance. In a strictly scientific history of political economy the book would hardly be worth mentioning. But sensational works of this kind have their role to play in the sciences just as much as in the history of the novel. Take, for instance, Malthus’s book on Population. Its first edition was nothing but a “SENSATIONAL PAMPHLET” and plagiarism from beginning to end into the bargain. And yet what a stimulus was produced by this lampoon on the human race!
Marx presented two main criticisms of What is Property in the same letter though. Firstly, he argues that, while Proudhon presents himself as critiquing all property, he is primarily focused on bourgeois property, a complete answer of which demands not only the more legal analysis Proudhon gives in his treatment, but also on the underlying relations of production. Thus the treatment is not as complete as the title would imply.
Secondly, he objects to referring to property as “theft” because the concept of theft seems to presuppose the existence of property relations which are being violated by. This criticism is found commonly, even outside of Marx. This appears to be one of the weakest objections possible to Proudhon as it seems focused only on the phrase itself, one which Proudhon admits from the very first lines might strike people as confusing, but which he makes a detailed case for and explains the meaning of the terms he was using. This typically turns out to be little more than a handwave at Proudhon rather than anything serious.
Furthermore, it also misses the point that apparent oxymorons are frequently used in everyday language, and especially in political speech. No one seems to make similar complaints if someone asks that we “demand the impossible.” Proudhon’s work is also full of these types of reversals of expectation, not the least of which is his claim that “society seeks order in anarchy.” This criticism seems like little more than a dislike of a certain writing style.
That all being said, these deliberate and challenging reversals can make Proudhon a challenge for many to read, especially almost two centuries later. For that reason, I hope my own summary can help anyone looking to get a better grasp of this work.
Putting that aside, this first chapter is interesting because we have a clear description of Proudhon’s conception of a revolution and progress. Proudhon is still clearly heavily influenced by Enlightenment thought, and spends a good bit of time narrativizing history as this steady advancement of humanity towards truth and justice from a more barbaric past. This also includes some interesting remarks contrasting views of human consciousness against those of people like Immanuel Kant.
Proudhon also has a somewhat surprising stance that the French Revolution was no true “revolution” at all, since in its form of government it retained the errors of the old system, merely multiplying the number of sovereigns with the change from a monarchy to a democracy. It was progress, but not a revolution.
What Proudhon wants instead is this rule of “wills” to be replaced by a rule of “reason” or “fact,” which sounds nice, but has not properly been described yet. What we can determine however is that this error has largely been retained because the French system was still based on property, which is ultimately identical with civil inequality and despotism. How we might consistently oppose that system with one based on liberty will be examined in the final chapter.
Summary of Chapter I: Method Pursued in This Work - The Idea of a Revolution
Adversus hostem æterna auctertas esto.
Against the enemy, revendication is eternal.
Property is robbery! That is the revolutionary conclusion of this work, which is so easily misunderstood. If we said “Slavery is murder,” we would be understood, since to enslave a man is to hold the power of life and death over them. Property is similar, despite usually being considered the opposite of robbery.
This is not some call for discord, but the new principle on which a healthy society needs to be built. This work is not focused on building that new system, but simply calling for justice against a wrong.
Why does misery exist in society? The reformists say it is because we have failed to uphold our principles due to weakness or corruption. But really, it is our principles themselves which are flawed because of an incorrect understanding of justice, equity, and liberty.
What we perceive is governed by rules of the mind. Some argue that these rules of the mind are innate, like a belief in causality or space and time. (Note: This is seen especially in the work of Immanuel Kant.) Proudhon disagrees, but mostly wants to point out that many such rules actually are put in place by habit. And if we work with the wrong kinds of mental categories, we are liable to err, and these categories are very difficult to correct.
We can see this in science. With a wrong belief, we can arrive at many wrong conclusions. For example, many people used to believe in a flat earth because they had a wrong theory of gravity. They thought things fell “down,” and therefore believed anyone living on the opposite side of the world would fall off! We escaped this error through a better theory of gravity. But even their incorrect theory still had some elements of truth which advanced our knowledge.
Things are similar in morality, but more serious. The universe does not mind an incorrect scientific theory, and will go on operating like it does. But an incorrect theory of morality will lead to great harm since it requires our participation. While desiring good, we will work evil. This is especially true in the long-run as error compounds.
Despite this, many obstinately refuse to give up their principles, biasing us against change. We refuse to admit when we are wrong, and will blame anything and everything else but ourselves, throwing us into war with one another. In reality though, we are born ignorant. We only advance by a process of learning, correcting past errors.
The present misery of society is a sign of some sickness. Society has been like this for a while too, so it seems like a deep-rooted error.
Is it religion? All men seem to believe in God, apparently being an inherent feature of the mind, yet they have different ideas of what God is. As our scientific understanding of the world becomes more advanced, our conception of God seems to grow with it. The most simple and naïve view is the anthropomorphic idea of God, which becomes truly monstrous when combined with the State leading to all sorts of holy wars. But if freedom of religion is respected, it is an otherwise harmless error. The source of our misery must be something else.
Others put man himself as the root of the problem, as a core flaw of our human nature. Sometimes this comes from the theologians, telling us about “original sin” and the transgressions of Adam, but we see it in the materialists as well, telling us about all these necessary evils. It is true that the human race, just like an individual, begins in ignorance, but we also move towards truth and the good. This is not an incurable disease, but a sign of our progress. They say “man errs because he errs.” The truth is that “man errs because he learns.” If we can cease these errs, it follows we can cease to suffer from them.
We still have a problem them because no one can find agreement on questions of justice, law, and government.
What is justice? The theologians tell us it comes from God. True, but that doesn’t answer our question. The philosophers should no better, but while they heavily praise it, they cannot explain it. The best teachings seem to come down to the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. But all that means is that our duty is equal to our right, without telling us what is our right!
Let’s try to give a better answer. The idea of justice governs society and our interactions and transactions with others. The law is an attempt to apply justice. If the law has a malformed idea of justice, then we are thrown into social chaos. Because humans need to learn, our idea of justice therefore progresses along with society.
In ancient Rome, a barbaric idea of justice reigned. Under the rule of Caesars it was corrupted with slavery, superstition, war, and usury. These flaws doomed this society to collapse. To stop this, some appealed to conservatism, hoping to return Rome to its glorious past and its “mercy” towards conquered nations. They were essentially reformists rather than revolutionists. But the problems went down to the very core, which is what led it to that miserable state. This society did not need to be reformed, but revolutionized.
Then a man named “the Word of God” came along, denouncing the priests and lawyers, declaring masters and slaves equal, condemning usury, proprietors, and idlers, and praising the poor and pure of heart. They killed him for this, but his seeds had been sewn, continuing to spread until they changed the world. With this revolution, idolatry was destroyed, slavery abolished, and justice established for all.
But this Christian movement was poisoned by mythology of idolatrous followers, moving away from practical application of his teachings and its implications for morality and government. Instead, points of dogma and speculations became the main focus, building a ridiculous system of theology, i.e. the science of the infinitely absurd, and the rule of the Church, dividing society once again.
This could be seen in France, which was divided then between the nobility, the clergy, and the people. With time, the ideas of freedom spread among the latter. While some spoke of reform, real momentum came when the Third Estate asserted it would do away with the nobles and clergy. If the king was their public servant, after all, they had the power to get rid of him and punish him. And they succeeded in doing so.
This movement of 1793 was more negative than positive, focused on what it opposed rather than what it intended to build. This led to a fatal error as the evils of the old system were carried over. Without any new principles, the French “Revolution” was really no revolution at all.
Revolutions require a fundamental change in principle thanks to new observations. Progress, by contrast, merely tries to reform and expand existing principles. By maintaining the notion of sovereignty, replacing only that of the monarch with that of the people, only progress, not a revolution, was achieved. It replaced the rule of the will of one with the will of many, but what we need is the rule of reason, not wills.
This is not to say it was worthless. The move to democracy is genuine progress. With more wills involved, there is more of a chance for reason to shine through. But we cannot say it is a revolution if it is following the same principle. This is especially true when we consider that this “popular” will is less popular than it seems, requiring some small group of representative agents.
What is sovereignty? It is said to be the power to make laws. This is a relic of despotism. If sovereignty is anything, it is a right, not a force. From this definition, it was claimed that the law is merely an expression of the will of the sovereign. But this view of the law as a mere expression of will again reveals the problem. The issue we face is not with the number of wills, but that we are ruled by “will” instead of by fact.
The principles declared in the “revolution” show several other errors. France declared that “All men are equal by nature and before the law.” But we are not equal by nature. We are different in size, beauty, talents, etc. What they actually intended was civil or political equality, in which case it would have been sufficient to say ‘equal before the law.’
But are we equal before the law? It seems we are not. Equality before the law implies an equality of rights, which is incompatible with our system of inequality of fortune and station.
In the old system, people were excluded from civil and military office. Against this, the Declaration of Rights declared that “All citizens are equally eligible to office; free nations know no qualifications in their choice of officers save virtues and talents.” But this was a farce. No such qualifications would need to be stated if these offices were seen not as a public duty but as a source of enrichment. The truth is that, despite this reform, the offices would still be handed out to friends and flatterers. Thus under the empire, “virtues and talents” were seen as military bravery and devotion to Napoleon.
Perhaps most tragically of all, the people copied over from the ancient régime the legality of property. God forgive them! They had hoped to expand the privileges held by proprietors to everyone, and while the most odious forms of property were abolished, the principle remained.
Despite the “revolution” then, our society is still based on these three principles:
Sovereignty of the human will, i.e. despotism
Inequality of wealth and rank, i.e. civil inequality
Property
Are these principles compatible with justice?
Everyone today condemns despotism, the authority of man over man, and instead demand the authority of the law based on truth and justice. This is appropriate, as the function of government is to find truth and justice to write laws, and superintend the execution of the law. The private will has no place in this. This was not always the popular view, and many have praised despotism in the past like of Louis XIV when he declared “I am the State!” We needed to advance to this. Our idea of justice has developed.
But peoples’ opinions on political and civil inequality are more mixed, with some approving and others disapproving. This is because this question is deeply tied into our view of property.
Today, property seems to be defended by everyone as just. The aim of this book is to prove it unjust, and has a deliberate strategy in doing so.
First, we shall examine the arguments given in defense of property fails. This is because every such argument must appeal to some principle of justice which ultimately will lead to equality, therefore negating property. This will be covered in two chapters, the first (chapter 2) considering arguments based on occupation, and the second (chapter 3) considering ones based on labor and talent. In reality, occupation obstructs property while labor destroys it.
Because of this, property is impossible, demanding we build a society that is simultaneously equal and unequal. We may end by examining the origin and development of property, and why it will be abolished.
If property is this contradictory notion, we must also examine why equality does not exist. This will also be covered in two chapters. The first (chapter 4) will cover the impossibility of property, as it relies on this contradiction of simultaneous equality and inequality. While we have accidental cases of property, it cannot be thought of as a coherent institution or principle. The second (chapter 5) final chapter will examine the principle of justice and the origin of property. Demonstrating the identity of despotism, civil inequality, and property, we will establish the true basis of just government.
The gauntlet has been thrown down by the defenders of property. Proudhon is here to take up that challenge. Equality continues to advance every day, and where equality has failed to win by the sword, his argument will conquer by the pen.